The Topeka, Kansas tornado June 8, 1966.
(Courtesy of Topeka Capital-Journal, Topeka, Kansas.)
| Disasters are the ultimate test of emergency response capability. The ability to effectively deal with disasters is becoming more relevant because of factors that tend to increase risk. Unfortunately, there are recurring difficulties with disaster response. Lessons learned in previous disasters are not always being applied in other communities. Sometimes this is because accurate information regarding the basic underlying causes of the difficulties is not readily available to emergency and disaster responders. The purpose of this text is to summarize what the research on disasters has revealed about these underlying causes. |
DISASTER: THE ULTIMATE EMERGENCY
"When I got out of the ambulance there were people lying everywhere. Police officers were carrying people out of the front door of the hotel, bystanders were helping others out; and many people were just running into each other trying to get out of the hotel. It was absolute pandemonium. I could see about 200 people outside. Half of them were lying in the grass and the parking lot driveway.... When I walked into the hotel, people began pulling at me wanting me to help their wives, husbands or friends.... There were people chopped in half, just torsos lying about; people with limbs sheared off, people crushed flat, ones that were still trapped screaming for help. There is no way I can explain the helplessness that overwhelmed me when I saw this. There must have been more than a 100 people still in that hotel dead and in major trauma-and there I stood not knowing what to do next."
Jim Taylor, Paramedic
Hyatt Hotel Disaster
Kansas City
July 17, 1981 (Stout, 1981)
Paramedic Taylor was about to make decisions that could have had life or death consequences for a large number of people.
Many people have pondered how they would cope with a disaster of such magnitude. This has been, in fact, a topic of intrigue throughout the ages. Fascination with disasters is reflected in the number of news accounts, movies, and books that deal with the subject. Even before mass communication, and in preliterate times, ballads sprang up after every catastrophe. People want to know what it is like when a town is obliterated by a wall of water or when high-rise hotel guests are trapped by a fire on the 35th floor.
| "They want to know how others act under such extreme situations, using disaster as a test for bringing out what is normally hidden-the best and the worst in people, the abilities normal life does not tap, and the dark motives we all repress. As we read about disaster, in safety and comfort, we vicariously test ourselves and our society-How would I have behaved, how would my community have behaved?" (Barton, 1969:xliii) |
For the emergency or public safety professional, this question has much more relevance than that of curiosity. These persons are the ones to whom the community will look for leadership and guidance in the event of a disaster. For them, more than anyone else, it is a test of all their training, experience, and ability; for them disaster is the ultimate emergency.
THE RISK OF DISASTER
Concern about disasters is becoming increasingly relevant as increases in population density, population shifts, and increasing technology make it likely that we will encounter disasters more frequently and that they will be more severe (Drabek, 1986:60, 70). Conservative estimates suggest, for example, that the dollar losses from disasters in the year 2000 will be double that experienced in 1980 (Petak, 1985). There are several reasons for this:
Increasing Population Density
For one thing, as areas become more densely populated, there are more potential victims when a disaster strikes. Because of this, future hurricanes or earthquakes of the same magnitude as in the past will tend to result in greater losses Quarantelli, 1981a).
Increased Settlement in High-Risk Areas
Another reason for increasing disaster losses is that part of this increase in population density is occurring in disaster-prone areas. There is greater settlement in high-risk areas such as flood plains, earthquake faults, coastal hurricane areas, unstable hillsides, areas subject to wildland fires, and areas adjacent to hazardous waste landfills, airports, and nuclear power plants (Petak, 1985; Cigler, 1986; Drabek, 1986:341, 374; Lantis, 1984:2).
For example, between 1960 and 1970 the population along the Texas gulf coast increased 24.8% (as compared to a national population increase of only 14.2%) (Davenport, 1978:1). According to one report, these changes in coastal population density are reflected in the increased time required to evacuate hurricane-threatened areas (17 hrs. for Tampa Bay, Florida; 26 hrs. for Galveston, Texas; and 24 hrs. for Beaumont-Port Arthur-Orange, Texas). This is in the face of estimated maximal warning times of 10 to 12 hours (Ruch, 1984:390).
This pattern of settlement in high-risk areas is reflected in the death rate from flash floods, which tripled from the 1940s to the 1970s (Quarantelh, 1979b). In fact, floods are the most serious natural disaster in the U.S. in terms of lives lost, personal suffering, property damage, and frequency of occurrence. Yet, de-spite the fact that flood losses are increasing each year, people almost invariably move back into the same area after a flood, and sometimes in even greater numbers (Cigler, 1986; Comm. on Disasters, 1980:20).
EXAMPLE: Flood, Pearl River, Mississippi, April 11-18,1979. Property loss in the City of Jackson and its surroundings was estimated at $0.5 billion. Yet the most damage occurred to buildings erected in the very same area previously inundated by the flood of 1961 (Drabek, 1985b:32).
Sometimes, in the process of settling high-risk areas, natural protection against environmental threats is removed. For example, along seashores vulnerable to hurricanes, protective sand dunes are removed to make way for houses (Drabek, 1986:374). Paving of large areas in or near settled flood plains prevents water from being absorbed by soil and vegetation. This type of situation in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, led to extensive flooding during Hurricane Agnes. The property damage that resulted was among the largest in any U.S. disaster (FEMA, 1983d:88).
Finally, the vulnerability of people living in high-risk areas is increasing because the inhabitants are often unaware of the potential risks and how to deal with them (Drabek, 1986:341). People are living in structures that are not designed to resist the forces of local natural hazards. For example, persons moving to the Gulf Coast are increasingly likely to live in mobile homes which are more vulnerable to wind damage, as evidenced by a 700% increase of mobile home sales in these areas in a recent 10-year period (Drabek, 1986:375). Another example is the number of homes built in areas at risk for wildland fires that have extremely flammable, wood-shake roofs.
Increased Technological Risks
New technology is adding to the list of disaster agents at an ever-increasing rate. One of these is the 4 billion tons of hazardous chemicals that are shipped annually in this country. Approximately 10% of all trucks (Quarantelh, 1981a) and 35% of all freight trains carry dangerous cargos (Kasperson, 1985). There is a proliferation of high-rise office buildings and hotels that subject their inhabitants to fire threats not experienced before. Our society is also becoming more dependent on technology and specialization, making us more vulnerable to disasters like the mass power outage in the northeastern United States in 1965 Quarantelli, 1979b; Quarantelli, 1985; Drabek, 1986:375). Our dependence on computers is introducing a new form of disaster vulnerability. A major earth-quake in California could disable the computers on which banking and financial institutions depend and which interconnect with the rest of the United States. This could result in a nationwide, or perhaps worldwide, monetary crisis (Quarantelli, 1985).
RECURRING RESPONSE DIFFICULTIES
In the face of ever-increasing risk of disaster losses, there is good reason to be concerned about our ability to deal with these catastrophes. Review of past disasters shows a number of recurring difficulties with disaster response though their causes may be considerably more complex than is superficially apparent. One community will experience a disaster and critique its response. Suggestions are made, and an article may be written about the "lessons learned" so that others may benefit from the experience. But, as other communities experience similar catastrophes, the same mistakes are sometimes made all over again. Not only do people sometimes fail to learn from the mistakes of others, but they may even neglect to correct their own, previously noted deficiencies.
EXAMPLE: The Air Florida Crash, Washington, DC, January 13, 1982. In a 1980 letter to the Federal Aviation Administration, the Airline Pilots Association stated, "Even though the vast majority of takeoffs and landings at DCA (National) are over water, the marine crash-fire-rescue resources are severely limited. " In spite of this warning, the same problems were present when Air Florida Flight 90 crashed into the 14th Street bridge and then into the Potomac river in 1982 (Adams, 1982:54).
ACCESS TO ACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT DISASTERS
One of the reasons that lessons about disasters are not learned is because it is difficult for emergency responders and planners to get accurate information about what happens in disasters, so that they may profit from the lessons learned by others.
Attributes of Published Disaster Accounts
Many disaster reports lack documentation, objectivity, and perspective. This statement refers, in particular, to those reports in publications most often read by emergency responders.
Documentation
Many articles make recommendations for disaster planning without providing adequate documentation of their validity or effectiveness. Others merely de-scribe a locale's disaster plans or drills, or tell what "should happen" rather than what actually "does happen." Of the few that describe actual disasters, many of these merely recount what happened rather than analyzing the effectiveness of the plan or the response (Reynolds, 1976:4,9).
Objectivity
Many published articles are narratives of a single disaster written from the perspective of one individual. Frequently, the author is one who was actually involved in the incident or was in charge of some aspect of the disaster planning or response. It is never easy for one to impartially evaluate the actions of his own organization. Too often, post-disaster critiques turn out to be defenses or justifications of what was done, rather than objective assessments of problems and mistakes. Valuable lessons may be missed because of the bias held for one's own community or organization (Quarantelli, 1982b:15). In addition, published accounts may delete material that may cause political embarrassment or in-crease the liability of the response participants. Finally, many disaster critiques are assembled solely for "in-house" use aimed at correcting internal shortcomings and are not meant for others' benefit.
Perspective
The recounting and evaluation of a disaster by a person involved in the response has another inherent limitation, that is, the narrow perspective avail-able to any single participant (especially if his attention is focused on action rather than observation). Each participant can have only a limited view of the total picture (Rosow, 1977:204; Yutzy, 1969:vi). This factor is illustrated by the following quote from an account of the Kansas City Hyatt Hotel skywalk collapse:
| "Nothing we write in this report can describe what happened. The personal accounts provided by EMT Gary Frank and Paramedic Jim Taylor may help the reader gain a better feel for what went on. We were there, and except for occasional flashes of comprehension, we can't get a handle on it ourselves." (Stout, 1981:34) |
The task of developing the overall picture of what happens in a disaster is like piecing together the history of a battle. Ernie Pyle, the famous World War II correspondent, observed that:
| "War to the individual is hardly ever bigger than a hundred yards on each side of him." (Pyle, 1946:98) |
Of the disaster articles most likely to be read by emergency responders and planners, few are the result of interviews with large numbers of participants in a disaster. Also rare are any articles examining the interrelation among the various responding organizations (Reynolds, 1976:8). This is unfortunate, since coordination among the various agencies involved in the disaster is almost always a problem.
Another limitation of these disaster articles is that they may describe some feature of a disaster, but fail to observe how characteristic it is. Attention may be focused on something because it is particularly dramatic or unusual, even though its frequency of occurrence is small. This may lead to a distorted picture of what is common in disasters and what is not (Barton, 1969:xlvii; Quarantelli, 1982b:15; Quarantelli, 1985:21). The point here is that disciplined study of disasters requires that you make quantitative observations. You need to find out such things as: How often does panic occur? Or, how many casualties have serious (versus trivial) injuries? Or, how frequently are there shortages of blood, doctors, or hospital beds? Yet, such quantitative observations are not common in these disaster articles (Barton, 1969:54).
In addition to quantitative observations, comparative ones are important. It is essential to determine what disaster characteristics and problems are predict-able and recurrent (regardless of the location, type, size, rapidity of onset, and duration of the disaster), rather than just a fluke occurrence in a particular event. However, articles comparing different disasters to see what they had in common-are not common (Reynolds, 1976:2,3,16).
Disaster Research Reports
Because very few emergency responders are likely to be involved in enough disasters to gain adequate personal experience, and because of the narrow perspective offered by personal disaster experience, it is important to be able to collect information on disasters in some organized and disciplined fashion. Only in this way can we hope to gain a more objective idea of what happens in disasters and assemble a reasonable overall perspective of such events. Because this is difficult and expensive, the data have only begun to be accumulated. Nonetheless, a significant body of knowledge has been collected, and it paints a picture about disasters that is sometimes different from what we might expect.
In contrast to many reports in publications read by disaster responders, there are disaster research reports that result from the careful analysis of information collected from a multitude of participants, sometimes even from a number of disasters (Reynolds, 1976; Rosow, 1977:ii; Quarantelli, 1983:15). Unfortunately, despite the fact that a significant body of such information has been collected, much of it is not easily accessible to emergency responders and disaster planners Quarantelli, 1979b:14,15), because:
1) Much of the research is located in unpublished reports, out-of-print books, and technical journals that are not circulated among emergency responders.
2) Many reports are written using technical terminology that, while appropriate for the academic audience for which they were writ-ten, may be difficult for others to understand (e.g., disaster responders and members of emergency response organizations).
For this text, an attempt has been made to survey existing research literature on disasters and to summarize some of the important and relevant concepts and observations. Sources of information include fairly early works, such as the series of studies carried out in the 1950s by the Committee on Disasters of the National Research Council; the University of Chicago, National Opinion Re-search Center studies (Marks, 1954) and classic works by Fritz (Fritz, 1956; Fritz, 1961), Barton (Barton, 1963; Barton, 1969), Baker (Baker, 1962), Form and Nosow (Form, 1958), Raker (Raker, 1956), and Williams (Williams, 1956).
Much of the more recent research referred to in this text comes from the University of Colorado's Natural Hazards Research Center in Boulder. The largest amount of data, however, are from the Disaster Research Center. The Disaster Research Center was established in 1963 at The Ohio State University, and 21 years later it was relocated at the University of Delaware. It was the first center of its kind in the world and has the largest collection of books, periodicals and reports related to the socio-behavioral aspects of disasters.
Probably the most interesting and far-reaching study referred to in this text is one carried out by the Disaster Research Center in the 1970s. In this study, E.L. Quarantelh examined emergency medical services in 29 major disasters in various communities throughout the United States and its territories and compared them to identify the common patterns (Quarantelli, 1983). Rather than focusing on the activities of an individual hospital or ambulance service, Quarantelli carried out his observations on a systems level, noting how the various organizations affected each other. Quarantelli's works are cited frequently in this text because he has carried out a large part of the existing published research on disasters.
This material is supplemented by a number of technical reports and non-research papers. In most cases, these are used to provide specific examples and anecdotes to illustrate points made in the more academic research studies. Sometimes this was necessary because researchers felt that the subjects they interviewed would be more candid if their names, and the names of their community and organization, remained confidential.
LAG BETWEEN RESEARCH AND PROGRESS
Quality research on disasters takes time, and funding is often difficult to obtain. There is, accordingly, a lag before recent improvements are reflected in the research studies. For example, there are those who may believe that triage has improved since the time of the Disaster Research Center studies (see Chapter 8) of the 1970s. However, another comparative, multi-disaster study of triage has not been carried out to verify that belief. Although there may well have been improvements, some evidence suggests that many of the disaster response problems that were present in the '50s, '60s, and '70s, are still seen in some form in the '80s.
The long list of problems associated with disaster response does not mean to suggest that it is typically carried out by persons or organizations that are incompetent, bungling, or lacking in care and concern. This is not at all the case. The history of disasters is rife with unsung heroes, sacrifice, and remarkable improvisation under conditions of extreme duress and uncertainty. In many cases, the difficulties are "system problems," not problems with individual behavior or effectiveness. They reflect the fact that organizations evolve to take care of common community problems. Disasters, however, pose unique problems often different even from the more routine emergencies that police, fire, medical, and other emergency organizations face on a day-to-day basis. Accordingly, the everyday emergency systems are not always well adapted to tackle disaster problems.